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Abstract 
 
We use responses to survey questions in the 2010 Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth 
that ask consumers how much of an unexpected transitory income change they would consume. We 
find that the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) is 48 percent on average, and that there is 
substantial heterogeneity in the distribution. We find that households with low cash-on-hand exhibit 
a much higher  MPC than affluent households, which is in agreement with models with 
precautionary savings where income risk plays an important role. The results have  important 
implications for the evaluation of fiscal policy, and for predicting household responses to  tax 
reforms and redistributive policies. In particular, we find that a debt-financed increase in transfers 
of 1 percent of national disposable income targeted to the bottom decile of the cash-on-hand 
distribution would increase aggregate consumption by 0.82 percent. Furthermore, we find that 
redistributing 1% of national disposable income from the top to the bottom decile of the income 
distribution would boost aggregate consumption by 0.33%. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Marginal Propensity to Consume, Fiscal Policy, Consumption Heterogeneity. 
JEL Code: E21, D91. 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements. We thanks seminar participants at the Central Bank of Ireland, the Meeting of 
the ECB-HFCN group in Vienna, the MPC Conference at the Center for American Progress 
(Washington D.C.), the Macroeconomic Dynamics Workshop at LBS, Michalis Haliassos, the 
editor, two anonymous referees, and especially Fabrizio Perri for comments. Yichen Su provided 
valuable research assistance. We acknowledge financial support from the Italian Ministry of 
Universities and Research (Jappelli) and the European Research Council starting grant 284024 
(Pistaferri). 
  1 1. Introduction 
 
Knowledge  on  how consumers respond to income shocks –the Marginal Propensity to 
Consume (MPC) − is crucial for evaluating the macroeconomic impact of tax and labor market 
reforms, and for the design of stabilization and income maintenance policies.  Distinguishing 
whether consumption responds differently to transitory or permanent income changes is equally 
important. In this paper, we use  information on how much consumers would spend of an 
unexpected windfall  gain equal to their average monthly income. Hence, we can characterize 
empirically the distribution of MPC in response to an unexpected transitory variation in income.   
In a standard life-cycle permanent income model, consumption is proportional to lifetime 
disposable resources (or permanent income), and hence all consumers respond in a similar way to 
income shocks, that is, there is no heterogeneity in the MPC. Models with precautionary savings, 
liquidity constraints or bequest motives, in contrast, suggest that consumers respond differently to 
changes in their economic resources. Indeed, the MPC of prudent individuals falls with household 
resources; liquidity constrained consumers exhibit higher MPC than households who can access 
credit markets to smooth consumption; and if bequests are luxury goods, rich individuals consume a 
smaller fraction of their lifetime resources.
1 In addition to these level effects, the composition of 
household resources may also matter. For instance, households burdened with large debts might 
react to a positive change in income by reducing their debt rather than spending (Dynan, 2012; 
Mian and Sufi, 2010). Moreover, if most of the wealth is locked into illiquid assets, households 
must cut consumption even in the face of a negative transitory income shock (Kaplan and Violante, 
2011). 
The importance of the consumer response to fiscal policies is attracting renewed attention 
given the large fiscal stimulus packages enacted by governments on both sides of the Atlantic to 
counteract the Great Recession. One of the major problems for policymakers is to assess the 
effectiveness of such policies as debt-financed fiscal packages or redistributive programs that 
maintain the public deficit unchanged. For instance, fiscal reforms that increase the tax burden of 
the rich are often advocated as a way to finance unemployment insurance schemes or other welfare 
programs. As mentioned above, in standard life-cycle models, these revenue-neutral redistributive 
policies produce no consumption effects in the aggregate because of homogeneity in the MPC. In 
these models, the consumption of the rich is no more than a scaled-up version of the consumption of 
the poor and any increase in the latter’s consumption is matched exactly by a decline in the 
consumption of the former. However, more realistic models with precautionary savings or liquidity 
1 See, e.g., Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes (2004). 
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                                                 constraints feature MPC heterogeneity. Since aggregate consumption depends on the distribution of 
MPC within the population, redistributive fiscal policy potentially might boost national income.  
A major problem in estimating the MPC is isolating the exogenous shocks to income which 
can be used to  track consumption behavior after a shock. The literature has considered three 
approaches. A first method identifies  episodes in which income changes unexpectedly, and 
evaluates in a quasi-experimental setting how consumption reacts to such changes (due to, say, 
unemployment or disability, see Browning and Crossley, 2001, and Stephens, 2001). A second 
approach is to rely on a statistical decomposition of income shocks and the covariance restrictions 
imposed by the theory on the joint behavior of income and consumption, and use long panel data to 
relate income shocks to consumption changes (Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston, 2008).  Survey 
questions containing responses to hypothetical income changes represent a third alternative and also 
the strategy adopted in this study, which relies on a unique question in the 2010 Italian Survey of 
Household Income and Wealth (SHIW).
2 The survey is designed to elicit information on how much 
people would consume or save were they unexpectedly to receive a reimbursement (or transfer) 
equal to their average monthly income. The responses to this question provide a sample distribution 
of the MPC that we can relate to observable characteristics and, most importantly, compare with the 
predictions of intertemporal consumption models and use to perform policy analyses. 
In our sample, we find that the average MPC is 48  percent, at the high-end of current 
estimates based on survey data on observed consumption and income changes.
3 Most importantly, 
we find quite substantial heterogeneity in people’s responses, ranging from zero to 1 across the 
entire distribution of the household’s resources. In particular, households with low cash-on-hand 
exhibit a much higher MPC than affluent households, which is in agreement with models where 
income risk or liquidity constraints play an important role. The empirical distribution of the MPC 
can be used to perform some simple policy simulations designed to predict the consumption 
response to tax interventions. We consider the cases of both government enacting a transfer policy 
financed by issuing debt and government redistributing income from rich to poor in a revenue-
neutral scheme.  We find that the response of aggregate consumption to these policies is 
substantially higher than in a benchmark case when the MPC is assumed to be the same for each all 
household. 
Our approach is based on the assumption that there is no systematic discrepancy between the 
intention to spend and actual spending behavior. Given this assumption, a first advantage of our 
approach  is that it solves the econometric problems of identifying genuine income shocks and 
isolating their effect on consumption, from other confounding forces. A second advantage is that, 
2 See Shapiro and Slemrod (1995; 2003) and Sahm, Shapiro and Slemrod (2009). 
3 Sahm, Shapiro and Slemrod (2009) find an MPC of about one-third. 
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                                                 relative to experimental approaches and statistical decompositions of income shocks, where absence 
of long panels forces researchers to make strong distributional assumptions about the relationship 
between consumption growth and shocks to households’ resources, no such assumptions are needed 
in our context. A third advantage is that the survey question delivers the MPC for each household, 
while in most studies in the literature, the sample sizes are too small to obtain precise estimates of 
MPC for specific population groups defined by age, education, or household resources - hence most 
focus on average MPC. This means that researchers are unable to evaluate the effect of 
redistributive policies on aggregate consumption. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical predictions about the 
MPC and reviews various methods proposed for its estimation, focusing particularly on studies that 
rely on direct survey questions. Section 3 describes the data and the question used to elicit the MPC. 
Section 4 presents the descriptive analysis and regression results relating the MPC to demographic 
variables, household resources, and proxies for credit constraints. In the same section we compare 
the empirical distribution of the MPC with the one that results from calibrating a dynamic 
heterogeneous agent model. Section 5 provides a series of policy experiments to illustrate how 
MPC heterogeneity affects the aggregate consumption response to tax reforms and redistributive 
fiscal policy. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. Theoretical predictions and empirical approaches 
 
The standard life-cycle model and the permanent income hypothesis suggest that consumption 
should react to unanticipated income shocks, and that the response should be stronger for permanent 
than for transitory income shocks.
4 Our survey question refers to a transitory income shock, and 
hence we would expect a relatively low consumption response.  
In models with quadratic utility, the MPC is equivalent to the annuity factor and is 
independent of household resources (the sum of current assets and the present discounted value of 
income). In the infinite version of the model, the annuity factor is (approximately) equal to the real 
interest rate, while in the finite-life version of the model MPC increases with age because the 
elderly have a shorter horizon over which to smooth consumption.  
In contrast to models with quadratic utility, models with prudent individuals predict that MPC 
will depend on the level of household resources. Carroll and Kimball (1996) show that adding 
income  uncertainty  to the standard optimization problem with preferences characterized by 
4 The same models suggest that consumption does not respond to anticipated income changes.  
  4 
                                                 prudence, produces a concave consumption function in which MPC from cash-on-hand declines 
with the level of wealth. The intuition is that consumers with less wealth have less ability to protect 
their consumption against income shocks. This means that as their wealth reduces, their fear of low 
income realization increases, which intensifies the strength of their precautionary saving motive.  
Binding liquidity constraints also change some of the implications of the standard models. If 
people want to borrow but face binding liquidity constraints, the current marginal utility of 
consumption is high relative to future periods. Therefore an unexpected positive income shock 
raises current consumption one-to-one, regardless of the persistence of the shock. This assumes that 
the income shock is not large enough to overcome the credit constraint, which may be a reasonable 
assumption in the context of the survey question we exploit. 
5 
Any test of the theoretical predictions regarding the size of the MPC involves the problem of 
identifying the type of income change faced by consumers. Jappelli and Pistaferri (2011) survey the 
methodologies used by applied researchers to identify exogenous and unexpected income changes: 
(a)  quasi-experimental settings in which researchers use episodes when income changes 
exogenously in an unexpected way due, for example, to tax reforms; (b) making specific 
assumptions about the income process in order to distinguish the distribution of shocks from actual 
income realizations.
6 A useful alternative to these approaches is to sidestep the problem of 
identifying income changes, and to ask direct survey questions about the response of consumption 
to hypothetical or actual changes in income. In this paper we use a survey question to estimate the 
response of consumption to an unanticipated transitory income change. 
Shapiro and Slemrod (1995; 2003) and Sahm, Shapiro and Slemrod (2009) have used this 
approach extensively in the US context. In particular, they rely on survey data to measure individual 
responses to actual or hypothetical tax policies. Household responses to tax rebates are coded 
according to three categories: mostly spend, mostly save, mostly pay off debt.
7 Given the 
qualitative  nature of the survey questions,  they  rely on distributional assumptions  to translate 
mostly-spend rates into an aggregate MPC. Shapiro and Slemrod (1995) examined the effectiveness 
of President Bush’s temporary reduction in income tax with-holding in 1992.
8 One month after the 
tax change was implemented, they surveyed about 500 taxpayers and asked: (a) whether they were 
5 The bequest motive for saving is a further cause of MPC heterogeneity. A bequest typically is modeled as a luxury 
good, which leads to consumption being a concave function of cash-on-hand. Hence, when cash-on-hand increases by a 
given income amount, the poor mostly consume it, while the rich mostly save it to contribute to a bequest. 
6 Identifying such shocks  from income realizations is difficult because people often have information that is not 
observable by the econometrician. For instance, they may know in advance that they will face a temporary change in 
their incomes (e.g. seasonal lay-off, or a tax rebate). When this change is realized, the econometrician measures it as a 
shock while, in fact, it is an expected event. 
7 E.g., the question in the Michigan survey was: “Thinking about your family’s financial situation this year, did the tax 
rebate lead you mostly to increase spending, mostly to increase saving, or mostly to pay off debt?” 
8 The change was transitory since it was offset by a planned smaller tax refund in 1993. 
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                                                 aware that income tax withholding had decreased, and (b) what they were planning to do with the 
extra money in their paychecks, i.e., mostly save it or mostly spend it. They found that 40 percent of 
those interviewed planned to spend the extra take-home pay, suggesting that even a temporary tax 
change can be effective for increasing household spending. 
Analysis of the 2001 income tax rebate reports a lower estimate of the marginal propensity to 
consume (22% of interviewed households reported plans to spend the tax rebate), and little evidence 
of myopia or liquidity constraints (Shapiro and Slemrod, 2003). Sahm,  Shapiro and Slemrod’s 
(2009) analysis of the 2008 tax stimulus provides intermediate findings (an MPC of about one-
third) and also that the lowest income group and the group with no stock ownership have slightly 
higher mostly-spend rates than the higher-income groups and stock owners but the differences are 
small and statistically insignificant. Their final conclusion is that less-well-off households are not 
more likely than rich households to spend a tax rebate.
9 
It is worth pointing out that a quite different branch of the literature estimates the effect of 
anticipated tax changes on consumption using quasi-experimental approaches, as opposed to the 
response to unanticipated income changes we study. The best known applications use features of 
the tax system, such as social security payroll caps (Parker, 1999), tax refunds (Souleles, 1999), pre-
announced tax cuts (Souleles, 2002), and the recent tax rebates or stimulus payments (Johnson, 
Parker and Souleles, 2006; Parker, Souleles, Johnson and McClelland, 2011; Agarwal, Liu and 
Souleles, 2007; and Misra and Surico, 2012). These studies typically find evidence of excess 
sensitivity of consumption to anticipated income changes induced by tax reductions, with relatively 
larger responses among low-wealth and low-income households, which is consistent with liquidity 
constraints. Given the small sample sizes and short panels, the evidence on heterogeneity in these 
studies is limited to group comparisons and rarely is precisely estimated. Moreover, any evidence of 
heterogeneity obtained in the “anticipated income change” context does not necessarily reproduce 
the extent of response heterogeneity in the “unanticipated income change” setting that we are 
studying. 
 
3. The survey question 
 
To characterize the MPC, we rely on the following question posed to respondents to the 2010 
SHIW (the original Italian wording is reported in Appendix 1): 
9 Sahm, Shapiro and Slemrod (2009) also compare the pattern of answers provided in response to other US surveys that 
address the same question in slightly different ways. They compare 12 surveys conducted by nationally recognized 
polling organizations, and find that they are relatively consistent in relation to frequency of responses in the mostly 
spend/mostly save categories. 
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Imagine you unexpectedly receive a reimbursement equal to the amount your household earns 
in a month. How much of it would you save and how much would you spend? Please give the 
percentage you would save and the percentage you would spend. 
 
The survey covers a cross-section of 7,951 households and provides detailed information on 
demographic variables, income, consumption, wealth (broken down into real assets, financial assets, 
and various debt components). We will see that it contains also useful variables to measure credit 
constraints, attitudes to risk, financial literacy, and other characteristics that potentially might affect 
the MPC. 
The SHIW covers  a representative sample of the Italian resident population.
10 Data are 
collected through personal interviews. Questions concerning the whole household are addressed to 
the household head or the person most knowledgeable about the family’s finances; questions on 
individual incomes are answered by the individual household member wherever possible. The unit 
of observation is the family, which is defined as including all persons residing in the same dwelling 
who are related by blood, marriage, or adoption. Individuals described  as “partners or other 
common-law relationships” are also treated as family. 
Note that, in contrast to surveys that ask for qualitative information (mostly save/mostly 
spend) about how people spend temporary tax rebates, the question we analyze is hypothetical and 
quantitative  (people are asked what percentage of the reimbursement they would spend).  The 
advantage of quantitative survey responses is that they overcome the problem of comparing 
responses across individuals who might interpret the statement “mostly spend/mostly save” in 
different ways. Another advantage is that by asking for a numerical value for the MPC, one avoids 
the problem of obtaining an aggregate MPC from the aggregation of qualitative responses. Finally, 
the design of the survey question addresses the potential problem that consumers’ responses to 
income changes depends on the size of the change. The survey question ties the amount of the 
transfer received to the monthly income as opposed to asking how the respondent would spend a 
fixed sum of money (i.e., a $500 tax rebate).
11  
10 The sample design is similar to the Labour Force Survey conducted by ISTAT (the Italian national statistics agency). 
Sampling is carried out in two stages: the first covers the selection of municipalities, the second the selection of 
households. Municipalities are categorized into 51 strata, defined by 17 regions and 3 classes of population size (over 
40,000, 20,000-40,000, less than 20,000). All municipalities in the first group are included; those in the second and third 
groups are selected randomly with a probability proportional to their population size. In the second stage households are 
selected randomly from registry office records (Bank of Italy, 2012). 
11 Questions about the US 2008 tax rebate may suffer from a “size effect,” if the magnitude of the rebate was small 
relative to the incomes of many households. Though the US rebates have been mainly lump sum, Parker et al. (2011) 
and Sahm et al. (2010) try to tease out the “size effect” by looking at rebates relative to income. 
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                                                 Some caveats are needed related to four issues: (a) consumption vs. spending, (b) external 
validity, (c) quality of interviews, and (d) time period for the spending decision. First, the question 
refers to the marginal propensity to spend, not to consume, and the two differ by the propensity to 
use the refund to purchase durable goods. If people’s response is that they intend to spend a large 
part of the refund, this could refer to a plan to buy a durable good rather than to spend on non-
durable goods. In the first case, people “mostly save” the refund despite declaring that they would 
spend 100 percent of it, making it more correct to use the term “marginal propensity to spend” 
rather than “marginal propensity to consume”. While acknowledging the importance of this 
distinction, we prefer the acronym MPC and its conventional use.
12 Second, most of the interviews 
took place between April and July 2011, when the economy had just recovered from the 2007-09 
recession, but also heading towards a further slump with GDP growth of -2.4% in 2012. Hence it 
might not be obvious how to extrapolate the distribution of the MPC estimated during a given year 
to other periods. A third caveat, common to all research eliciting  subjective expectations or 
behavior in hypothetical scenarios, is that respondents might have little incentive to answer the 
questions truthfully, might have trouble understanding the wording of the questions, or might in 
practice display quite different behavior from their reported behavior. A final caveat concerns the 
fact that the question offers no period of reference for the planned expenditure.  
At the end of the next section we discuss in detail the sensitivity of our results to the framing 
and context of the survey question. In particular, in Section 4.4 we consider whether the pattern of 
responses is affected by measures of financial literacy available in the survey, while in Section 4.5, 
we look at the issues of durables vs. nondurable spending, external validity, and timing of planned 
spending.    
 
 
4. Empirical evidence 
 
4.1. Descriptive evidence 
 
Figure 1 plots the distribution of the responses to the survey question on MPC. It shows a 
heavy concentration of responses in three categories. Around 22 percent of respondents reported 
that they would spend nothing out of the reimbursement (MPC=0), around 16 percent reported that 
they would spend the entire reimbursement amount (MPC=1), and around 24 percent said they 
12 The importance of distinguishing between non-durable and total spending is highlighted by Parker, Souleles, Johnson 
and McClelland (2012), who find that households spent 12-30% of their 2008 US stimulus payments on non-durable 
goods, but this rose to 50-90% when durable goods are included. 
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                                                 would spend 50 percent of it. These responses are therefore reminiscent of the “mostly save”, 
“mostly spend” and “partly save/partly spend” coding used by Shapiro and Slemrod in their 
qualitative assessment of the MPC. Figure 1 also shows a “heaping” at rounded values (10%, 20%, 
etc.). 
The sample mean of the MPC is 48 percent, substantially higher than the predictions of 
standard consumption models on the impact of a transitory shock.
13 A possible explanation for this 
large deviation from the theoretical benchmarks is that the question does not distinguish between 
durable and non-durable consumption. Another explanation is that many households belong to 
population groups for whom liquidity constraints or myopia are important. For these reasons, we 
focus on the relation of the MPC with observable characteristics and in particular on the difference 
in the MPC across the distribution of household resources. 
We start by exploring the relationship between MPC and cash-on-hand, defined as the sum of 
household disposable income and financial wealth, net of consumer debt. Figure 2 shows that 
average MPC declines sharply with cash-on-hand, from around 65 percent in the lowest cash-on-
hand percentile  to some 30 percent for the richest households.
14 Above we noted a large 
concentration of responses in the MPC=0 and MPC=1 categories. Figures 3 and 4 plot the fraction 
of respondents reporting MPC values at the two extremes of 0 and 1, by cash-on hand percentiles. 
The fraction of MPC=0 is only 10 percent for the poorest households, and increases steadily to 40 
percent in the richer segment of the sample (Figure 3). The fraction reporting MPC=1 declines from 
40 percent to 10 percent across the cash-on-hand distribution (Figure 4). This descriptive evidence 
is indicative of two aspects: first, there is wide MPC heterogeneity; second, MPC declines sharply 
with household resources.  
 
4.2. Regression evidence  
 
To characterize better the determinants of MPC variability in our sample we rely on 
regression analysis. Summary statistics for the main variables used in our estimation are presented 
in Table 1; Table 2 reports the baseline regressions. Since the dependent variable is censored from 
13 Kaplan and Violante (2010) investigate this issue simulating a life-cycle model in which consumers have isoelastic 
preferences, face income risk during their working lives, and retire at age 65. They conclude that the MPC with respect 
to permanent shocks is considerably larger than the MPC with respect to transitory shocks (0.7 vs. 0.06). Blundell, 
Pistaferri and Preston (2008) provide empirical estimates of the MPC with respect to income shocks that are not too 
dissimilar from these theoretical benchmarks. 
14 Using a completely different approach based on matching actual and predicted consumption transition probabilities, 
Jappelli and Pistaferri (2004) estimate an MPC of 0.4 for the low educated and 0.10 for the high educated, confirming a 
negative relation between measures of permanent income (measured here as education) and the MPC. 
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                                                 above and below, we use a two-limit Tobit estimator.
15 We present the main results, then focus on 
credit constraints and finally perform robustness checks. 
The first specification in column (1) includes only demographic variables: age dummies, 
gender, marital status, education, family size, dummies for city size, and residence in the South. 
Except for family size, all coefficients are statistically different from zero. In particular, the MPC is 
roughly constant throughout the working life, declining after retirement by about 7 percentage 
points (the omitted category is the 60+ age group). This pattern contrasts with the predictions of 
standard consumption models that MPC, with respect to transitory shocks, increases with age. One 
possible explanation is that bequest motives, survival risk or risk of large medical expenses lead 
elderly households to save a larger fraction of their windfall income than younger households. 
Married couples show a slightly lower MPC, while more educated households display slightly 
lower MPC. Regional and city size dummies signal that the reported MPC tends to be higher for 
households in the South and in larger cities.
16 
However, some of these differences might be explained by correlation with omitted measures 
of household resources, as indicated graphically by the pattern in Figure 3. In column (2) we add 
cash-on-hand quintile dummies to the list of regressors. The results confirm a strong negative 
correlation between MPC and cash-on-hand. The coefficients are precisely estimated and decline 
monotonically with the quintile dummies. In particular, going from the first to the fifth cash-on-
hand quintile is associated with a 30 percentage point decline in the MPC. Interestingly, the 
strongest decline occurs at low levels of wealth (an 11 percentage point decline between the first 
and second quintiles). Adding household resources changes the impact of education and age and 
reduces the size and significance of other coefficients. In particular, the age dummies are smaller 
and show a slightly increasing pattern during the working life, although there is still a decline after 
retirement. The third specification, in column (3), adds a dummy for unemployed household heads. 
While all other coefficients are unaffected, we find that the MPC is 7 percentage points higher for 
the unemployed, perhaps an indication of binding borrowing constraints or higher incidence of 
debt.
17  
It may be more appropriate to focus on people in the labor force, who face rather different 
constraints and shocks to their resources (e.g., income and unemployment shocks) with respect to 
the elderly, for whom health shocks, bequest motives, and survival risk play more important roles. 
Table 3 repeats the estimation, but excluding households older than 60. The results are largely 
15 The results presented below are unchanged if we use a simple OLS estimator. 
16 None of the results change if we replace the South dummy with a full set of regional dummies.  
17 Some people have volatile monthly income and therefore the answers to the survey question may depend on the 
particular month they have in mind when answering the question. To control for this effect, we add employment and 
sector dummies in the regression, and find similar results. Dropping the self-employed also does not change our results. 
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                                                 confirmed: (1) a strong negative correlation between MPC and cash-on-hand, (2) a roughly constant 
age pattern of MPC during the working life,
18 and (3) a positive, albeit less precisely estimated, 
coefficient of the unemployment dummy. 
The effect of cash-on-hand on MPC may be due in part to changes in disposable income and 
in part to changes in financial assets, net of debt. Table 4 presents a breakdown of the cash-on-hand 
distribution into its three components, adding dummies for income and financial assets quintiles, 
and dummies for homeownership and positive debt.
19 The results in Table 4 column 1 show that 
each of the three components of cash-on-hand are strongly negatively correlated with the MPC. 
Going from the first to the fifth income quintile results in an 11 percentage point decline in the 
MPC, while going from the first to fifth quintile of financial assets results in a 26 point decline. 
Again, the steepest declines occur at low levels of income and of financial wealth (5 and 11 points, 
respectively). On the other hand, the coefficient of the dummy for homeownership is rather small 
and not statistically different from zero. When we introduce the unemployment dummy, in column 
2 we find that the coefficient is slightly lower than in Table 2 (0.056 vs. 0.07) and is less precisely 
estimated. 
The survey question does not allow us to distinguish between households who intend to repay 
debt rather than save or spend. In Italy, only 24 percent of households have any debt (including 
mortgage debt), the average debt-income ratio is 0.3, and only 3 percent have a debt/income ratio 
greater than 3. This issue is then probably less relevant in our Italian sample than in countries where 
households are highly leveraged. To further analyze the role of debt, we include in our specification 
a dummy for positive debt. The coefficient is negative and precisely estimated. Households with 
debt have an MPC 9 points lower than the rest of the sample. A plausible interpretation is that these 
households would use part of the reimbursement to pay off their debts, rather than increasing their 
spending.
20 As a final check, in column (3) of Table 4 we drop observations with positive debt 
(which hence makes the interpretation of the survey question unambiguous relative to the debt 
issue) and find no appreciable changes in any of our results.  
 
 
4.3. Credit constraints 
 
18 Figure 1 in Meghir and Pistaferri (2010) shows that in models with quadratic utility and finite horizon the MPC with 
respect to transitory shocks only rises substantially after around retirement, so data may not have the power to detect 
small increases over the working stage of the life cycle. 
19 We also introduce the value of real assets: the coefficient is close to zero and imprecisely estimated.  
20 Adding to the specification the level of debt itself does not change our results, and the debt level variable is 
statistically insignificant.  
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                                                 As already pointed out, the strong negative correlation between MPC and cash-on-hand might 
be explained by precautionary saving, liquidity constraints, or a combination of the two. Liquidity 
constrained individuals increase spending one-to-one if they receive additional income. In practice, 
cash-on-hand might be strongly correlated with access to credit, and lack of it might exclude people 
from the credit market.  
Similarly, the response of prudent individuals to an additional unit of income depends on 
cash-on-hand. Poor consumers live on the edge of (precautionary) fear, and hence an extra unit of 
income leads to a higher MPC. Rich consumers, instead, have already accumulated resources to 
smooth consumption, and hence have a lower MPC.  
As noted by Deaton (1991),  it is hard to distinguish empirically between borrowing 
constraints and precautionary savings. To isolate the relation between cash-on-hand and MPC, we 
can control directly for indicators of access to credit available from the SHIW. We consider three 
indicators: (1) whether people have been turned down for credit in the past, or have been 
discouraged from borrowing (the wording of the question is reported in Appendix 1); (2) whether 
they have access to an overdraft facility; (3) whether they have a credit card. 
While the effect of current credit constraints is to increase the MPC, the effect of our proxy 
(being turned down for credit) is less clear-cut. On the one hand, being turned down when applying 
for credit  may be correlated with the presence of current constraints, and therefore may be 
associated with a high MPC. On the other hand, having been turned down for credit in the past 
signals a high probability of being credit constrained in the future, which increases the expected 
variability of consumption growth, and therefore induces a low MPC due to a combination of 
borrowing constraints and precautionary saving.  
The results are reported in Table 5. The first regression adds to the baseline the indicator for 
being turned down. The estimated coefficient suggests that the MPC is lower among those who 
report having been turned down for credit or discouraged from borrowing. Since this variable 
signals also a high probability of being credit constrained in the future, the negative coefficient is 
consistent with fear of future borrowing constraints in combination with a precautionary motive for 
saving. Indeed, using the panel section of the SHIW we find evidence that being turned down 
for/discouraged from applying for credit is persistent over time, providing support for the 
explanation that people who were unable to access credit in the previous year might fear being 
excluded from credit in the future.
21    
21 SHIW contains indicators for access to credit between 1991 and 2010. We calculate the coefficient of correlation 
between contemporaneous and lagged access to credit in the panel section of the survey. We find that being turned 
down for credit in year t increases the likelihood of being turned down in year t+1 by about 10 percentage points. 
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                                                 The coefficients of the other indicators for access to credit (credit line and credit card) are not 
statistically different from zero (Table 5 column 2). The coefficient of the turned down question is 
higher in absolute value (-0.17) if we exclude the elderly (columns 3 and 4) from the sample. 
 
4.4. Measurement Error 
 
One concern with subjective expectations and hypothetical questions  similar to the one 
exploited in this paper is people’s understanding of the survey question. Our question on MPC 
requires the respondent to understand that the reimbursement is an amount equal to their monthly 
income (not an absolute amount), and to be able to compute a percentage (planned consumption 
relative to reimbursement). 
To address this, Table 6 reports three robustness checks. In the first experiment in column (2), 
we check whether understanding of the financial questions is correlated to the MPC. We rely on an 
indicator of financial literacy constructed by summing correct answers to three questions on interest 
compounding, risk diversification, and mortgage contracts (the indicator ranges from 0 to 3). The 
wording of the literacy questions, proposed in Lusardi and Mitchell (2011), is set out in Appendix 1. 
The regression coefficient of financial literacy is close to zero, supporting the idea that people with 
relatively low financial literacy do not exhibit a tendency to under-report or over-report MPC.
22 
We also check whether particular values of MPC are associated with lower literacy (results 
not reported here for reasons of space, but available on request). We define dummy variables for 
each of three modes of the MPC distribution (0; 0.5; 1) and run probit regressions using the 
specification in Table 6, column 1. We find no evidence that lower level of literacy is associated 
with a higher likelihood of any of the three responses. The result for the probit regression which 
models the probability of responding MPC=0.5, is particularly interesting in light of the fact that 
when asked to pick a number between 0 and 1, some people might choose 0.5 because they are 
uncertain about the meaning of the question. A related concern is that low-wealth households may 
be more likely to report MPC=0.5 because of lower understanding of the survey question. The 
results, however, indicate that no variable of the baseline specification is systematically related to 
the probability of reporting MPC=0.5, including wealth. In particular, three of the cash-on-hand 
quintile coefficients are small and insignificant, while the coefficient on the top wealth quintile is 
significant but positive (0.04). As a further check of the sensitivity of the result to the inclusion of 
22 As a further robustness check we focus on the sample of individuals with relatively high literacy, that is, those 
responding correctly to at least two literacy questions. The pattern of results in column 2 is unchanged with respect to 
the baseline estimates. 
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                                                 the MPC=0.5 value, we drop these observations, which reinforces the relation between cash-on-
hand and MPC (the difference between the bottom and top quintiles is 0.44). 
As a final check, we focus on a sub-sample of individuals with high quality responses. At the 
end of  each interview, SHIW interviewers evaluate the quality of the answers provided by 
respondents. The evaluation is performed on a 0-10 scale, representing the respondents’ general 
understanding of the survey questions. In column (3) of Table 6 we focus on a sample of 5,479 
high-quality interviewees, i.e. respondents who received a score of at least 8 from the interviewer.
23 
The results are again confirmed: there is strong correlation between MPC and cash-on-hand, a 
relatively flat age profile of MPC until retirement, a positive but not always significant correlation 
with unemployment, and a negative effect of previous credit constraints on the MPC.  
   
4.5. Robustness  
  In this subsection we consider the importance of the framing and context of the survey 
question in explaining our findings. 
In  standard  intertemporal consumption  model  with durables, the level of nondurable 
spending changes in the same proportion as the stock of durables. For instance, Bertola et al. (2005) 
develop a case with a Cobb-Douglas utility function that delivers this property even in the presence 
of income risk. With adjustment costs on durable purchases, the model is of the (S,s) variety and 
implies that consumers with high values of the durable stock/nondurable spending are the ones 
more likely, for given realization of the income shock, to hit one of the bands and adjust their 
durable stock. In our context, consumers of this type are precisely the ones who might report a high 
MPC because they are planning to purchase a durable good. To control for this source of MPC 
heterogeneity, we use information available in our survey about nondurable spending and the stock 
of durables, construct the durable stock/nondurable ratio, and add it to our baseline specification.  
We find that the coefficient on the ratio is insignificant and the difference in MPC between top and 
bottom quintiles remains unchanged.  
Another issue is that the reported MPC could depend on the macroeconomic context, 
namely the question was asked in the second quarter of 2011 (a transitional year between a double-
dip recession), potentially limiting the external validity of our results. To partially address the issue, 
we use information available in the survey of whether people’s consumption choices for the survey 
year were unusually high or low relative to a “normal” period.
24 Restricting the sample to those 
23 Results focusing on respondents who received a score of at least 9 or exactly 10 are also similar.   
24 The question asked is: “You told me that your average monthly spending in 2010  was [actual amount]. Would you 
say that this spending was unusually high, unusually low, or equal to what your household would spend in a “normal” 
year?”. 
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                                                 who report that their spending was similar to what they would do in a “normal” year, we find that 
results are very similar. This suggests that people respond to the MPC question mostly having in 
mind a “normal” situation. 
A final issue is that the question does not ask consumers over which period they plan to 
spend or save the transfer (i.e., one month, one year, or the entire lifetime). Hence, in principle 
MPC heterogeneity may reflect different beliefs about the timing of planned spending. However, if 
this was the case, one would have to conclude that the poor, who report higher MPC, are 
systematically more likely to believe that the question is asking about spending over a long period 
of time (i.e., MPC is close to 1 if respondent interpret the survey question as asking about spending 
the transfer over the entire lifetime), while the rich are systematically more likely to believe that the 
question refers to short-term spending (i.e., MPC is close to zero if respondents interpret the survey 
question as asking about spending the transfer over the next month). Although we cannot rule out 
this possibility, we find it a highly implausible and contrived route to explain the pattern of MPC 
heterogeneity we find in the data. 
 
4.6. Interpretation 
Given the many caveats related to the interpretation of the survey question (timing, durable 
vs. non-durable spending, the role of debt, etc.) we think it is more interesting to focus on the 
heterogeneity of the MPC by household characteristics rather than on its level. The most striking 
source of heterogeneity in MPC uncovered by our empirical analysis is the 25-30 percentage point 
increase when moving from the top to the bottom quantiles of the cash-on-hand distribution. This 
result is quite robust to the particular specification used, inclusion of control variables (including 
the durable-nondurable ratio, financial literacy, and context variables), and omission of the 50 
percent mode. 
One may wonder whether this evidence is consistent with models of intertemporal 
consumption behaviour. In the absence of precautionary savings and liquidity constraint, the MPC 
with respect to a transitory shock is homogeneous across consumers. To get a sense of the ability of 
alternative models to replicate the patterns in the data, we consider the Ayiagari’s (1994) model 
populated by heterogeneous agents with CRRA preferences, an exogenous borrowing constraint 
preventing wealth from being negative, and an income process featuring a stochastic component 
given by the sum of an AR(1) process and an i.i.d. transitory shock.
25 After solving the model using 
standard calibrated parameters (an interest rate of 4 percent, a discount factor of 0.95, risk aversion 
of 2, an AR parameter of 0.98, a standard deviation of the persistent shock of 0.03, and a standard 
25 We thank Fabrizio Perri for sharing with us the Matlab and Stata codes generating these results. Details are available 
in Appendix 2. 
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                                                 deviation of the transitory shock of 0.01), we find the optimal consumption rule. To mimic the 
hypothetical windfall gain equivalent to 1/12 of yearly income (as considered in the survey 
question), we normalize mean income to 1, set the transitory shock to 0.1, compute the distribution 
of MPC with respect to transitory shocks implied by the model and compare it with the distribution 
of MPC in the data. In the Ayagari’s model, the consumption function is concave and the MPC is a 
decreasing function of cash-on-hand, so we know that the model will be at least qualitatively 
consistent with the data. A different question is whether a version of the model is able to replicate 
the quantitative pattern of MPC heterogeneity we observe in the data. In this respect, the most 
crucial moment to match is the 25-30 percentage point decline across the cash-on-hand distribution. 
After exploring a wide range of parameter values, it turns out that the key parameter 
affecting the shape of the MPC distribution by cash-on-hand is the discount rate. If we set the 
discount factor to β=0.95, the model generates a 5 percentage point decline in the MPC across the 
wealth distribution (see the lower line in Panel B of Figure A1). Raising the level of impatience in 
models with precautionary savings produces what has come to be known as the buffer stock model 
(Deaton, 1991; Carroll, 1999). Only if we make agents extremely impatient (letting β=0.6) can the 
buffer stock model model reproduce the extent of heterogeneity we observe in the data (the upper 
line in Panel B of Figure A1). This value of the discount factor is commonly regarded as 
implausible. Furthermore, it generates a distribution of wealth that does not match what is observed 
in the data.  
To generate an MPC distribution that is based on more plausible parameter values and 
replicates the shape observed in the data, one may considered a version of the Ayagari’s model in 
which (1) a fraction of consumers follow the optimal consumption rule dictated by the model, (2) 
another fraction follows a rule-of-thumb in which consumption equals income in each period, and 
(3) the fraction of rule-of-thumb consumers declines with the level of cash-on-hand. Although the 
latter assumption may seem ad-hoc, it is supported by empirical evidence from Italy (Jappelli and 
Pistaferri, 2004), and it is isomorphic to a model in which the poor have higher discount rates than 
the rich (ex-ante heterogeneity).
26 Using a completely different approach based on matching actual 
and predicted consumption transition probabilities, Jappelli and Pistaferri (2004) estimated that the 
fraction of rule-of-thumb consumers is 40 percent among the low educated (which is a group that 
includes disproportionally low cash-on-hand consumers) and 10 percent among the high educated (a 
group characterized by high cash-on-hand).
27 In Appendix 2 we show that a version of this mixture 
26 For instance, Cagetti (2003) uses PSID data and finds that β=0.98 for the high educated (college degree) and 0.84 for 
the low educated (high-school dropouts). 
27 In our data, high-educated households have cash-on-hand that is almost three times larger than low educated 
households. 
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                                                 model is able to replicate quite well the shape of the relationship between MPC and cash-on-hand 
we observe in the data (see Panel C of Figure A1). 
We stress that this exercise is illustrative and not designed to estimate “structural parameters” 
or to disentangle one model of consumption behavior from the other. Rather, the objective is to 
show that the degree of heterogeneity we observe in the data, while qualitatively consistent with 
models with incomplete markets and precautionary savings à la Ayagari, is still far from the one we 
observe in theoretical models, and that only by considering additional departures from the standard 
model (such as high discount rates, heterogeneity of discount rates across the income distribution or 
myopic behavior) can one match theoretical predictions with data evidence.   
 
 
5. Fiscal policy with heterogeneous MPC 
 
How important is MPC heterogeneity for assessing the effect of transitory income changes 
(such as tax rebates or stimulus packages) on the aggregate economy? In this final section we show 
that our data can be used to calculate the effect on aggregate consumption of a series of fiscal 
policies. In evaluating the consumption effects of these policies, for simplicity, we use the MPC 
sample distribution. Results using predicted MPC from our regressions (which control for a large 
set of variables) are qualitatively similar, and not reported here for reasons of space. It is worth 
stressing that the findings below should be seen more as a way to illustrate the direction in which 
redistributive policies or policies targeted to the poor might affect aggregate consumption, rather 
than at their face value. 
We consider several experiments. In the first experiment, we assume that government enacts a 
transfer policy financed by issuing debt (no taxes are levied).
28 In particular, we study a policy in 
which government transfers 1 percent of national disposable income equally among all individuals 
in the bottom 10 percent of the income distribution. This policy is equivalent to a transfer of €3,308, 
or 120 percent of average monthly income. We next consider two scenarios: in one MPC=0.48 for 
all individuals (the sample average), and in the other, the MPC is heterogeneous across the sample 
distribution. The results of these two experiments are reported in Table 7 (cases (a) and (b)), where 
28 In all experiments, we abstract from any general equilibrium effects arising from changes in asset prices and 
distortions induced by taxes and transfers on labor supply. However, it is worth noting that labor supply distortions of 
taxes are reduced by the lump sum nature of the tax (absent the targeting, there would be no distortions). We also 
neglect  network effects  on aggregate consumption  arising from interdependent preferences, which might induce 
changes in consumption in partial equilibrium even among individuals not directly targeted by the policy (De Giorgi, 
Frederikssen and Pistaferri, 2012). Note however that we do not need to assume that consumers are non-Ricardian (as 
long as the answers to the reimbursement question incorporate anticipation of future tax increases required to pay for 
current transfers).     
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                                                 we show the aggregate MPC (in column (1)) and the aggregate consumption growth resulting from 
the experiment (column (2)). In the homogeneous case (a), the aggregate MPC is obviously equal to 
0.48, and aggregate consumption increases by 0.62 percent. If the MPC is heterogeneous, targeting 
transfers at the bottom 10 percent of the population results in a higher aggregate MPC (0.62) and 
higher aggregate consumption growth (0.82 percent). The difference between the two cases is due 
to the higher MPC prevailing in the bottom part of the cash-on-hand distribution (shown clearly in 
Figure 2). Note that if government were to implement a pro-rich transfer to the top 10 percent of the 
income distribution (case (c) in Table 7), the aggregate MPC and consumption growth would be 
significantly lower (0.36 and 0.47%, respectively). 
Another experiment we consider is to transfer 1 percent of national disposable income equally 
among all households with at least one unemployed member (14% of the sample), see case (d) in 
Table 7. This is equivalent to an unemployment bonus of €2,400 (about 87% of average monthly 
income), roughly equal to three months of the unemployment insurance received by blue-collar 
workers. The quantitative impact of this policy will be to boost aggregate consumption by 0.76 
percent, with an estimated aggregate MPC of 0.58. The reason for the similar effect relative to a 
transfer to the bottom 10 percent of the income distribution is that households with unemployed 
members are mostly concentrated among the poor. 
29 
A different (and perhaps more compelling) type of experiment is a balanced-budget 
redistributive policy whereby the government finances a transfer to the bottom x percent of the 
income or cash-on-hand distribution (where 1≤ x ≤89) by taxing the top 10 percent of the income 
distribution. In all experiments, as before, tax revenues equal 1 percent of national disposable 
income. We assume that this amount is obtained by imposing a lump sum equal-sized tax on the top 
income decile, and that the government transfers this amount equally among targeted households. 
The details of the calculation are in Appendix 3.  
Figure 5 plots the aggregate consumption growth generated by the policy. Of course, with a 
homogeneous MPC, a pure redistributive policy has no effect on aggregate consumption. However, 
with a heterogeneous MPC, the effect is positive and highest if the program targets the very poor. 
For instance, a transfer to the bottom 10 percent of the income distribution would raise aggregate 
consumption by 0.33 percent; if the same program targets people with below-median income, the 
boost in consumption would be around 0.2 percent. 
We also consider a case where transfers are “means-tested” rather than being income-based. 
This case captures  an income support program for the lowest x  percent of the cash-on-hand 
29 We performed similar experiments giving the transfer to the lowest decile of the income (instead of the cash-on-hand) 
distribution, and obtain similar results, that is, a larger consumption effect for transfers to the bottom decile of the cash-
on-hand distribution. 
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                                                 distribution. The shape of the curve in Figure 5 is similar to the income-based case, but the overall 
consumption effect is stronger. The larger effect for programs based on cash-on-hand transfers 
depends on the stronger negative correlation of MPC with financial assets (which of course are part 
of cash-on-hand) rather than income (as illustrated by the regression results in Table 4).
30 
One might wonder how much of these aggregate consumption effects are due to a correlation 
between the MPC and the income (or cash-on-hand) distributions as opposed to a correlation with 
other characteristics that vary across the income distribution, such as age, education, family size, etc. 
To control for these confounding factors, we expand the baseline regression in column 3 of Table 2, 
replacing the cash-on-hand quintiles with a set of percentile dummies (Dk). Thus, we run the 
regression: 
 
i k ik k i i D X MPC ε γ β + + = ∑ =
100
1  
 
We then use the predicted value  ∑ = =
100
1
^
ˆ
k ik k i D MPC γ to compute the consumption effect of the 
means-tested program that can be attributed solely to the MPC heterogeneity across the cash-on-
hand distribution, controlling for demographic characteristics. The triangle scatter in Figure 5 
(“means tested-based transfer, conditional MPC”) shows that around 75% of aggregate 
consumption growth should be attributed to MPC heterogeneity across the income distribution, and 
about one quarter to correlation between MPC and other variables. To illustrate, consider the case 
of a redistributive policy targeted at the bottom 10 percent of the population. The figures shows that 
aggregate consumption would increase by 0.32 percent (the baseline scenario, or the red circle line). 
Of this increase, 0.27 per cent can be attributed to heterogeneity in the income distribution, and 0.05 
percent to sources of heterogeneity that are unrelated to income. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
We draw on survey questions in the 2010 Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth 
that ask consumers how much they would consume of an unexpected transitory income change. We 
find that the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) is 48 percent on average, substantially higher 
30 While these experiments consider lump-sum transfers, we also experimented with a progressive transfer (assuming 
the transfer decreases linearly with the level of income). The effect on aggregate consumption growth is higher as 
expected, but not dramatically different, at least with the level of progressivity we chose. For example, a progressive 
transfer to the bottom 10% of the income distribution increases aggregate consumption by 0.36% as opposed to 0.32% 
in the lump-sum case. 
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                                                 than predicted by the standard intertemporal consumption choice model. This average masks very 
substantial MPC heterogeneity across households. Indeed, regression analysis uncovers four main 
facts: (1) a strong negative correlation between MPC and cash-on-hand, (2) a relatively flat age 
profile of MPC until retirement, (3) a positive but often imprecisely measured correlation with 
unemployment, and (4) a negative association between being turned down for credit and the MPC. 
Our interpretation of the evidence is that the MPC distribution reflects the importance of income 
risk and expectations of future constraints in shaping consumption decisions. However, comparison 
of the empirical distribution of the MPC with models with incomplete markets and precautionary 
savings à la Ayagari indicates that only by considering additional departures from the standard 
model (such as high discount rates, heterogeneity of discount rates across the income distribution or 
myopic behavior) can one match theoretical predictions with data evidence. 
The results have important implications for evaluations of fiscal policy, and in particular 
predicting responses to tax reforms and redistributive policies. In particular, we find that a debt-
financed increase in transfers of 1 percent of national disposable income targeted to the bottom 
decile of the cash-on-hand distribution would increase aggregate consumption by 0.82 percent. 
Furthermore, redistributing income from the top decile to the bottom decile of the income 
distribution would boost aggregate consumption by about 0.1 percent. One important caveat is that 
our calculations of the aggregate effects of fiscal policy are performed assuming no general 
equilibrium effects, and in particular that fiscal policy does not impact asset prices and that tax 
changes have no effect on labor supply. Hence, our calculations are likely to be an upper bound to 
the true effects of fiscal policy.  
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Survey Questions 
 
Propensity to spend 
 
“Imagine you unexpectedly receive a reimbursement equal to the amount your household earns in a 
month. How much of it would you save and how much would you spend? Please give the percentage 
you would save and the percentage you would spend.”
31 
 
Note that respondents only reply to the “how much would you spend” part of the question, as the 
survey taker enforces adding up to 100 of the two questions at the point of the interview. 
 
Access to credit 
 
1.  Did the household contact a bank or financial company in 2010 with a view to obtaining a 
loan or mortgage? 
2.  Was the request granted in full, granted in part or refused? 
3.  Did your household later succeed in obtaining the amount needed, either from the same or 
from another financial intermediary? 
4.  During 2010 did you or a member of the household consider applying for a mortgage or a 
loan from a bank or financial company but later change your mind because you thought the 
request would be refused? 
 
 
Financial literacy 
 
1.  Imagine leaving 1,000 euro in a current account that pays 1% interest and has no charges. 
Imagine that inflation is running at 2%. Do you think that if you withdraw the money in a 
year's time you will be able to buy the same amount of goods as if you spent the 1,000 euro 
today? The question is coded as: (1) Yes; (2) No, I will be able to buy less; (3) No, I will be 
able to buy more. 
 
2.  Which of the following investment strategies do you think entails the greatest risk of losing 
your capital? The question is coded as: (1) Investing in the shares of a single company; (2) 
Investing in the shares of more than one company; (3)   
 
3.  Which of the following types of mortgage do you think would allow you from the very start 
to fix the maximum amount and number of installments to be paid before the debt is 
extinguished? The question is coded as (1) Floating-rate mortgage; (2) Fixed-rate mortgage; 
(3) Floating-rate mortgage with fixed installments. 
 
 
General understanding of the survey questions 
 
At the end of the interview, interviewers are asked to evaluate the overall quality of the interview. 
The question we used was: “On a scale between 0 and 10, where 0 is the minimum and 10 the 
maximum, how would you evaluate  the respondent’s level of understanding of the survey 
questions?” 
31 In Italian the question is: “Supponga di ricevere improvvisamente un rimborso pari a quanto la sua famiglia guadagna 
in un mese. Di questa somma quanta parte ne risparmierebbe e quanta ne spenderebbe? Indichi la percentuale che 
verrebbe risparmiata e la percentuale che verrebbe spesa.” 
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                                                 Appendix 2 
The Aiyagari’s model 
 
We assume that agents solve the following problem: 
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We assume the following income process: 
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where  t ε  and  t η  are i.i.d. normal processes with mean zero and respective standard deviations of 
ε σ  and η σ .  
Let  ( ) ε , ,z a c  and  ( ) ε , , ' z a a  be the optimal decision rules. Normalizing income to 1, an increase of 
t ε  of 10 percent (ε =0.1) is akin to the rebate considered in the survey question. From the budget 
constraint, we have that 
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Hence, the model’s equivalent of the MPC can be obtained directly from the decision rule as: 
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For calibration purposes, we use the following parameter values:  r=0.04, 
β=0.95, γ=2, ρ=0.98, σε=0.01, ση=0.03.. In a second experiment, we set β=0.6. These parameter 
configurations generate the MPC distributions shown in Figure A1, together with the empirical 
distribution (Panels A and B). Unlike what presented in Figure 2, here we plot the MPC by the level 
of cash-on-hand (normalized by median income) rather than by percentiles of cash-on-hand. In 
particular, we allocate households in ten bins of the distribution of cash in hand (relative to median 
disposable income): (0-0.2), (0.2-0.4), (0.4-0.6), (0.6-0.8), (0.8-1), (1-1.8), (1.8-3.5), (3.5-6), (6-8.5), 
(8.5-10), and compute average MPC within  each bin. The continuous lines are fractional 
polynomial fits, the shaded areas 95% confidence intervals. 
 
In Panel C we consider a mixture model in which consumers have plausible discount rates (β=0.95) 
and they can either behave as in the Ayiagari’s model above, or as rule-of-thumb consumers 
(consuming in each period their entire resources). We assume that the proportion of rule-of-thumb 
consumer declines with the level of cash-on-hand. In particular, we assume that the fraction of rule-
of-thumb consumers is 75% in bins 1-3, 45% in bins 4-7, and 30% in bins 8-10. 
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Calculation of the Fiscal Policy Experiments 
 
In all experiments (both debt-financed and balanced-budget), we assume that total revenues raised 
by the government are equal to: 
 
∑ × =
i
i y G 01 . 0  
 
The net transfer received by household i in the debt-financed experiment k (see Table 7) is: 
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G
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where 1{i∈g
k} is an indicator of whether i is a transfer recipient (which depends on which group is 
targeted by the policy) and n
k is the total number of transfer recipients.  
The net transfer received by household i in the balanced-budget experiment k is: 
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with  ( ) 0 = ∑i i k τ , k=1,…,89, pj indicates the j-th percentile of the relevant distribution (income or 
cash-in-hand), and nj is the number of individuals in percentile j. 
 
We define pre- and post-experiment aggregate consumption as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ∑ ∑ + = =
i i i i i i k c k C c C τ β ' ,   
 
where  βi  is the individual MPC elicited in the survey. The aggregate marginal propensity to 
consume we report in column 1 of Table 7 is simply:  
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Consumption growth generated by the policy is: 
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This is what is reported in column 2 of Table 7, and plotted in Figure 5 for the 89 different values of 
k. In the same graph we also plot the result of basing the experiment on the distribution of cash-on-
hand rather than income. This is what we called the “means-tested” experiment. Finally, we plot the 
result of basing the experiment on the distribution of cash-on-hand controlling for demographic 
characteristics as explained in Section 5. 
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  25 Figure 1. Self-reported MPC from transitory income shock 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Average MPC by cash-on-hand percentiles 
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  26 Figure 3. Fraction with MPC=0 by cash-on-hand percentiles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Fraction with MPC=1 by cash-on-hand percentiles 
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  27 Figure 5: The effect of a redistributive transfer program 
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  28 Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
 
  Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Minimum  Maximum 
         
Marginal propensity to consume (MPC)  0.476  0.357  0.000  1.000 
Age  58.374  15.761  18.000  99.000 
Male  0.545  0.498  0.000  1.000 
Married  0.623  0.485  0.000  1.000 
Years of education  9.576  4.595  0.000  20.000 
Resident in the South  0.324  0.468  0.000  1.000 
Family size  2.495  1.257  1.000  12.000 
City size less then 20,000  0.256  0.437  0.000  1.000 
City size 20,000-40,000  0.182  0.386  0.000  1.000 
City size 40,000-500,000  0.470  0.499  0.000  1.000 
City size over 500,000  0.091  0.288  0.000  1.000 
Cash (‘000 euro)       62.482  111.871  0.000  4381.469 
Disposable income (‘000 euro)  33.089  24.530  0.000  587.784 
Financial wealth (‘000 euro)  29.393  98.324  0.000  4154.771 
Unemployed  0.035  0.185  0.000  1.000 
Liquidity constrained  0.047  0.212  0.000  1.000 
Overdraft  0.269  0.444  0.000  1.000 
Credit card  0.320  0.467  0.000  1.000 
Late payment  0.010  0.102  0.000  1.000 
 
 
Note. Data are drawn from the 2010 SHIW. Total number of observations is 7,950.  
         
  29 Table 2. Baseline estimates 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Age 18-30  0.111  0.023   
  (0.034)***  (0.035)   
Age 31-45  0.106  0.042  0.040 
  (0.018)***  (0.019)**  (0.019)** 
Age 46-60  0.076  0.051  0.048 
  (0.016)***  (0.016)***  (0.016)*** 
Male  -0.028  -0.016  -0.017 
  (0.013)**  (0.013)  (0.013) 
Married  -0.041  -0.013  -0.012 
  (0.016)**  (0.016)  (0.016) 
Years of education  -0.005  0.005  0.005 
  (0.001)***  (0.002)***  (0.002)*** 
Family size  0.009  0.023  0.022 
  (0.007)  (0.007)***  (0.007)*** 
Resident in the South  0.339  0.276  0.276 
  (0.013)***  (0.014)***  (0.014)*** 
City size less than 20,000  -0.208  -0.193  -0.193 
  (0.023)***  (0.023)***  (0.023)*** 
City size 20.000-40,000  -0.185  -0.174  -0.174 
  (0.024)***  (0.024)***  (0.024)*** 
City size 40,000-500,000  -0.125  -0.120  -0.120 
  (0.022)***  (0.021)***  (0.021)*** 
I cash-on-hand quintile    0.293  0.287 
    (0.024)***  (0.024)*** 
II cash-on-hand quintile    0.186  0.184 
    (0.021)***  (0.021)*** 
III cash-on-hand quintile    0.133  0.132 
    (0.020)***  (0.020)*** 
IV cash-on-hand quintile    0.063  0.062 
    (0.019)***  (0.019)*** 
Unemployed      0.070 
      (0.034)** 
N  7,950  7,950  7,950 
 
Note. Estimation performed using Tobit. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *indicates significance at the 10% 
level, ** significance at 5%, *** significance at 1%. 
 
  30 Table 3. Determinants of MPC: Age less than 60 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Age 18-30  0.036  -0.033  -0.035 
  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.034) 
Age 31-45  0.032  -0.008  -0.008 
  (0.017)*  (0.017)  (0.017) 
Male  -0.045  -0.032  -0.032 
  (0.016)***  (0.016)**  (0.016)** 
Married  -0.050  -0.020  -0.018 
  (0.022)**  (0.022)  (0.022) 
Years of education  -0.010  0.001  0.001 
  (0.002)***  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Family size  0.005  0.019  0.019 
  (0.008)  (0.008)**  (0.008)** 
Resident in the South  0.338  0.269  0.269 
  (0.018)***  (0.019)***  (0.019)*** 
City size less than 20,000  -0.176  -0.158  -0.158 
  (0.030)***  (0.030)***  (0.030)*** 
City size 20.000-40,000  -0.178  -0.166  -0.166 
  (0.031)***  (0.031)***  (0.031)*** 
City size 40,000-500,000  -0.099  -0.095  -0.095 
  (0.028)***  (0.027)***  (0.027)*** 
I cash-on-hand quintile    0.321  0.315 
    (0.031)***  (0.031)*** 
II cash-on-hand quintile    0.199  0.197 
    (0.028)***  (0.028)*** 
III cash-on-hand quintile    0.123  0.122 
    (0.026)***  (0.026)*** 
IV cash-on-hand quintile    0.070  0.070 
    (0.025)***  (0.025)*** 
Unemployed      0.039 
      (0.034) 
N  4,315  4,315  4,315 
 
Note. Estimation performed using Tobit. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *indicates significance at the 10% 
level, ** significance at 5%, *** significance at 1%. 
 
 
 
   
  31 Table 4. Determinants of MPC: The role of disposable income, financial assets and debt 
 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Age 18-30  0.038  0.033  0.088 
  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.041)** 
Age 31-45  0.057  0.055  0.090 
  (0.019)***  (0.019)***  (0.023)*** 
Age 46-60  0.060  0.058  0.074 
  (0.016)***  (0.016)***  (0.018)*** 
Male  -0.013  -0.013  -0.027 
  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.015)* 
Married  -0.012  -0.011  -0.005 
  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.018) 
Years of education  0.006  0.006  0.007 
  (0.002)***  (0.002)***  (0.002)*** 
Family size  0.022  0.021  0.021 
  (0.007)***  (0.007)***  (0.008)** 
I income quintile  0.115  0.110  0.123 
  (0.028)***  (0.028)***  (0.032)*** 
II income quintile  0.058  0.055  0.094 
  (0.024)**  (0.024)**  (0.027)*** 
III income quintile  0.057  0.055  0.073 
  (0.021)***  (0.021)**  (0.025)*** 
IV income quintile  0.032  0.031  0.056 
  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.023)** 
I financial asset quintile  0.258  0.257  0.242 
  (0.024)***  (0.024)***  (0.027)*** 
II financial asset quintile  0.146  0.146  0.144 
  (0.022)***  (0.022)***  (0.024)*** 
III financial asset quintile  0.098  0.098  0.112 
  (0.020)***  (0.020)***  (0.023)*** 
IV financial asset quintile  0.045  0.046  0.043 
  (0.020)**  (0.020)**  (0.022)* 
Homeowner  -0.003  -0.003  -0.002 
  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.017) 
Positive debt  -0.090  -0.090   
  (0.015)***  (0.015)***   
Unemployed    0.056  0.017 
    (0.034)*  (0.040) 
N  7,950  7,950  5,967 
 
Note. Regressions include dummies for South and City Size (less than 20,000 inhabitants, 20-40,000, and 40,000-
500,000. Estimation performed using Tobit. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *indicates significance at the 
10% level, ** significance at 5%, *** significance at 1%. 
 
 
   
  32 Table 5. Determinants of MPC: The role of liquidity constraints 
 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Age 18-30  0.023  0.024  -0.033  -0.033 
  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.034)  (0.034) 
Age 31-45  0.047  0.048  -0.003  -0.003 
  (0.019)**  (0.019)**  (0.017)  (0.017) 
Age 46-60  0.052  0.053     
  (0.016)***  (0.016)***     
Male  -0.015  -0.015  -0.030  -0.030 
  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.016)*  (0.016)* 
Married  -0.014  -0.014  -0.023  -0.022 
  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.022)  (0.022) 
Years of education  0.005  0.005  0.000  0.001 
  (0.002)***  (0.002)***  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Family size  0.022  0.022  0.019  0.019 
  (0.007)***  (0.007)***  (0.008)**  (0.008)** 
I cash-on-hand quintile  0.293  0.292  0.326  0.322 
  (0.024)***  (0.025)***  (0.031)***  (0.033)*** 
II cash-on-hand quintile  0.185  0.184  0.200  0.198 
  (0.021)***  (0.022)***  (0.028)***  (0.029)*** 
III cash-on-hand quintile  0.133  0.132  0.125  0.123 
  (0.020)***  (0.021)***  (0.026)***  (0.027)*** 
IV cash-on-hand quintile  0.062  0.062  0.070  0.069 
  (0.019)***  (0.019)***  (0.025)***  (0.025)*** 
Unemployed  0.075  0.075  0.044  0.044 
  (0.034)**  (0.034)**  (0.034)  (0.034) 
Turned down for credit or discouraged  -0.125  -0.126  -0.176  -0.176 
  (0.029)***  (0.029)***  (0.032)***  (0.032)*** 
Overdraft    0.013    0.000 
    (0.014)    (0.018) 
Credit card    -0.011    -0.007 
    (0.015)    (0.019) 
N  7,950  7,950  4,315  4,315 
 
Note. Regressions include dummies for South and City Size (less than 20,000 inhabitants, 20-40,000, and 40,000-
500,000. Estimation performed using Tobit. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *indicates significance at the 
10% level, ** significance at 5%, *** significance at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
  33 Table 6. Determinants of MPC: Measurement error 
 
  Total sample  Excluding 
financial literacy 
<2 
Excluding 
quality of 
interview less 
than 8 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Age 18-30  0.029  -0.006  -0.008 
  (0.035)  (0.042)  (0.043) 
Age 31-45  0.055  0.036  0.038 
  (0.019)***  (0.022)  (0.023)* 
Age 46-60  0.059  0.034  0.047 
  (0.016)***  (0.019)*  (0.020)** 
Male  -0.012  -0.027  -0.020 
  (0.013)  (0.015)*  (0.016) 
Married  -0.010  0.004  -0.018 
  (0.016)  (0.020)  (0.021) 
Years of education  0.007  0.002  0.005 
  (0.002)***  (0.002)  (0.002)** 
Family size  0.021  0.010  0.011 
  (0.007)***  (0.008)  (0.008) 
I cash-on-hand quintile  0.258  0.296  0.307 
  (0.024)***  (0.030)***  (0.031)*** 
II cash-on-hand quintile  0.165  0.143  0.167 
  (0.021)***  (0.025)***  (0.026)*** 
III cash-on-hand quintile  0.120  0.121  0.119 
  (0.020)***  (0.023)***  (0.023)*** 
IV cash-on-hand quintile  0.054  0.047  0.056 
  (0.019)***  (0.021)**  (0.022)** 
Unemployed  0.075  0.066  0.093 
  (0.033)**  (0.040)*  (0.047)** 
Turned down for credit or discouraged  -0.131  -0.067  -0.145 
  (0.029)***  (0.036)*  (0.038)*** 
Financial literacy  -0.009     
  (0.006)     
N  7,950  5,292  5,479 
 
Note. Regressions include dummies for South and City Size (less than 20,000 inhabitants, 20-40,000, and 40,000-
500,000. Estimation performed using Tobit. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *indicates significance at the 
10% level, ** significance at 5%, *** significance at 1%. 
 
  34 Table 7. Effect of transfer policy financed by debt 
 
 
Policy: Transfer equivalent to 1% of national disposable 
income 
MPC=∆C/∆Y  
 
(1) 
Aggregate  
consumption growth 
(2) 
Homogeneous MPC     
(a)  Transfer to bottom 10%  0.48  0.62% 
     
Heterogeneous MPC     
(b)  Transfer to bottom 10%  0.62  0.82% 
(c)  Transfer to top 10%   0.36  0.47% 
(d)  Transfer to households with unemployed members  0.58  0.76% 
     
 
Note. In column (1), we report the aggregate MPC, computed as:  ( )
G
k
i i i ∑ τ β , where βi is the individual MPC, τi (k) is 
the transfer received by household i in policy experiment k, and G are total government revenues raised. In column (2), 
we report aggregate consumption growth, defined as  ( )
∑
∑
i i
i i i
c
k τ β , where ci  denotes  household  consumption.  In 
experiments (a) and (b), transfers are distributed equally among members of the first decile of the cash-on-hand 
distribution; in experiment (c), transfers are distributed equally among members of the top decile of the cash-on-hand 
distribution; finally, in experiment (d) transfers are distributed equally among households with at least one unemployed 
member. See Appendix 3 for more details. 
   
  35 Figure A1: MPC Heterogeneity in the data and in two consumption models 
 
 
 
Note. Each graph plots average MPC for households in ten bins of the distribution of cash-on-hand (relative to median 
disposable income): (0-0.2), (0.2-0.4), (0.4-0.6), (0.6-0.8), (0.8-1), (1-1.8), (1.8-3.5), (3.5-6), (6-8.5), (8.5-10). The 
continuous lines are fractional polynomial fits, the shaded areas are 95% confidence intervals. In Panel B we solve 
Ayagari’s model for two values of β (0.95 and 0.6). In Panel C we assume β=0.95 and that the fraction of rule-of-thumb 
consumers is 75% in bins 1-3, 45% in bins 4-7, and 30% in bins 8-10. 
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